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Abstract
When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts
that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incen-
tives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncer-
tainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through
courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed
to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should
be observed in the former system. This nding is backed by evidence
from a panel of OECD countries.
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11 Introduction
Countries dier to a considerable degree in the way they regulate their labor
markets (see, e.g., OECD (1994) and OECD (2004)). Moreover, very often
labor market regulation is put into legal code only in quite general terms. It
is left to labor courts to actually interpret and apply the code. Thus, labor
courts become actors in the sense that they produce binding rules which
rms and workers have to obey. This is particularly the case in legal systems
with a common law system, as opposed to countries with a civil law origin,
which leaves it to the courts to interpret general rules and to adapt them to
specic cases (see von Mehren and Gordley (1957)).
In this paper, we relate dierences in countries' legal systems with gov-
ernments' incentives to change labor market regulation. We develop and
test a theoretical model to show that governments have a larger interest in
reforming the labor market if they are confronted with a court system that
has more discretion in following their own preferences when interpreting the
legal code. If the government alone was responsible for achieving its goals,
it trades o unemployment and its preferred policy. Facing a court which is
possibly interested in unemployment as well the government anticipates that
part of its job might be done by the court and has an incentive to adjust
its policy closer to its own preferred platform. However, the government is
risk averse and therefore acts preemptively if uncertainty about the court's
preferences is high.
In the model, governments can undertake politically costly eorts to
deregulate labor markets which should result in lower unemployment.1 Labor
courts can, depending on the legal system, change regulation to some degree.
If there is more leeway for courts to interpret and change government regu-
lation according to their own preferences, governments have more incentives
to set employment friendly legislation. Intuitively this result stems from the
fact that a government is more willing to take the political costs of less labor
market regulation if it can be less sure that the legal system enforces the legal
1An assessment of the impact of various labor market institutions on labor market
performance can be found, e.g., in Blanchard (2006), Freeman (2005), or Nickell et al.
(2005).
2code in an employment friendly way. Contrarily, if there is less uncertainty
about the courts' interpretation of the law the government is less willing to
pursue costly reforms and relies instead on employment friendly court deci-
sions. Leaving it to the court to take the necessary steps, there is no need for
the government to take the blame for unpopular policy measures itself. In
addition to formally deriving our results in a simple game-theoretic model,
we present empirical evidence to support our theoretical results.
Our argument touches on several strands in the literature. Since our
main focus is governments' incentives to reform the labor market, our ap-
proach is closely related to the growing literature on the political economy
of economic policy reform.2 In this strand, various arguments have been
developed that try to explain the (non)occurrence of economic reform un-
der uncertainty. Relating to earlier work on the inuence of interest groups
(see Olson (1965)), war of attrition models explain delays in economic re-
form by arguing that uncertainty about the distribution of adjustment costs
is an obstacle to welfare increasing reforms (Alesina and Drazen (1991)).
Also, uncertainty about the benets of a policy change can obstruct eorts.
Again, welfare improving reforms may be voted down if the decisive voter is
uncertain about his individual benet from reform (Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991)). Policy changes, that would increase overall welfare, may also fail
because of the costly acquisition of necessary information which groups of
society the government should compensate for losses due to policy reform
(Gr uner (2002)). Focussing on the interaction between a government and
a central bank in a game-theoretic setup closely related to ours, Sibert and
Sutherland (2000), Calmfors (2001), Hefeker (2001) or Neugart (2002) study
the incentives of governments to reform labor markets as a consequence to
a change in the monetary regime. In particular, Hefeker (2006) argues that
more uncertainty about the central bank's reaction function can increase the
incentives of governments to implement labor market reforms.
We add to this existing literature by explicitly taking into account the le-
gal system as an additional player, because in our view too little attention has
2There are excellent surveys on the political economy of reform provided by Roland
(2002) or Drazen (2000).
3been paid to the active role that the court system may play in the context of
policy reform. This is particularly true in the eld of labor market regulation
where an increasing body of evidence suggests that courts have considerable
leeway in interpreting the legal code which, in turn, has repercussions on
the performance of labor markets. In the U.S., for instance, the tremen-
dous increase in the share of temporary agency work has been attributed to
the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine through court rulings (Autor
(2003)). There is also evidence for Italy that labor courts increasingly ad-
vocate in the interests of employees if the labor market is depressed (Ichino
et al. (2003)). For Germany, Berger and Neugart (2008) nd evidence for a
nomination bias in court rulings, that is, the share of settlements reached at
each stage of the legal process and the propensity to appeal systematically
varies with the political color of the government that nominated the judges.
Furthermore, they present evidence that the number of cases led to labor
courts increases unemployment signicantly.
Finally, we relate to the literature on legal origin (e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002), Klerman and Mahoney (2007) or Roe (2007)) and the role of legal
origin for regulatory action (e.g. La Porta et al. (1998), Djankov et al. (2002),
Djankov et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (2004), and Botero et al. (2005)). There,
legal origin is classied either as civil or common law with the distinguishing
feature that common law systems exhibit more judicial discretion. Accord-
ing to this approach, one should observe dierent institutional technologies
depending on the legal tradition of countries; while common law countries
depend more on markets and contracts, civil law countries depend more on
regulation. We use a binary variable developed to test those theories of legal
origin to distinguish common from civil law countries in our empirical anal-
ysis as a proxy for the uncertainty governments face with respect to what
the legal system will do in response to its policies. The underlying hypothe-
sis is that court behavior is less predictable in common law countries which
can therefore be characterized as creating more uncertainty for governments,
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Figure 1: Sequence of events
2 The model
Our model consists of two players, the government (G) and the legal sys-
tem (C) which comprises all labor courts.3 We assume the government is
Stackelberg-leader vis  a vis the labor court (see gure 1), taking into ac-
count the expected reaction function of the court. First, the government
makes its policy choice  concerning the level of labor market regulation.
Taking this as given, the court then decides whether and to what degree to
conrm, change or enforce the legal code. The labor court's level of regula-
tion is denoted by e. Since the model is solved by backward induction, we
begin by deriving the court's policy before turning to the government's policy
choice. First, however, we describe the economy and the objective functions
of the players.
2.1 The economy
Unemployment is given as
u = b u + e; (1)
where b u refers to the non-regulation level of unemployment in the economy
that is exogenous to government policy and court decision. This level may
also reect cyclical developments, changes in wages, changes in domestic or
foreign demand for domestically produced goods (for instance due to ex-
3We thus abstract from potential complications of non-coordinated behavior or conicts
among individual courts.
5change rate developments), or technological developments in the economy
with employment friendly technological developments lowering b u and vice
versa.4
We denote with e > 0 the regulation level set by the labor court which
may conrm the level of regulation that the government has set, which we
denote with  > 0, but may also deviate from that level e R . Government
regulation could reect, for instance, an increase in hiring or ring costs, the
implementation of minimum wage laws, benet systems or other actions by
the government that increase unemployment. The model is very simple in
the sense that we only look at unemployment and assume that all regulation
will increase unemployment. This is obviously a very strong simplication
of the labor market. Likewise, we postulate that all deregulation will lead to
more employment. Deviations of e from  reect the inuence of labor courts,
which might increase e > , decrease e < , or simply conrm government
policy in court  = e. We hence assume that e() is some function of . The
relation between e and  will be determined by the court's behavior.
2.2 Preferences




(u   kb u)




with E as the expectation operator. The government is interested in avoiding
deviations of unemployment from a target level lower than the non-regulation
level of unemployment b u, namely kb u with 0 < k < 1. Moreover, the gov-
ernment is averse to deviations of labor market regulation from its preferred
level b . The fact that governments aim at a consistently lower level of unem-
ployment and that they have \target" levels for regulation can be motivated
by postulating ideological leanings for the government, or by a politically
optimal level of unemployment and regulation, resulting from political sup-
4We therefore separate out regulation and other inuences on unemployment. While
apparently hard to separate in reality, we choose this setup in order to focus on our variable
of interest.
6port maximizing motives and a trade-o between the interests of dierent
groups in society, such as labor unions or employers' associations (see, e.g.,
Saint-Paul (2000)).5 Changes in government policy that lead to a deviation
of regulation from this level lead to an increasing loss in utility (for instance
in the form of votes that can be obtained). This basically reects the redis-
tributive feature of labor market policy reforms where some groups in society
gain and others lose. The inuence of such particular interests is reected
in c with a low c denoting a government being more concerned with employ-
ment per se and a high c reecting a government under considerable pressure
concerning regulation from societal groups.
For the labor court we assume an objective function (a loss function)
V
C = (1   )(u   kb u)
2 + (b + )(e   )
2 : (3)
The labor court also aims to avoid that unemployment deviates too much
from the target level.6 Furthermore, losses occur if the enacted legislative
code deviates from the enacted labor market regulation of the government
. Analogue to the specication of the government loss function both terms
enter additively and are weighted with terms (1 ) and (b+), respectively.
We dene b > 0, and  as a random variable with support [ b;1], mean
E[] = 0, and variance V ar[] = 2. This allows us to capture characteristics
of legal systems as well as the issue of uncertainty in the behavior of the
courts from the perspective of the government.
Consider the extreme case where there was no heterogeneity in court
behavior in which case  would just drop out of eq. (3). Then, it was only b
describing to which extent a deviation of the courts' behavior e would enter
a judge's loss function. A relatively higher b could characterize a civil as
opposed to a common law system as the former imposes tighter constraints
for the court's behavior.
5One could allow for dierent ideological leanings of the government by assuming b i
with i reecting dierent types of governments. A left wing government would have a
higher b i than a right wing government and vice versa.
6For simplicity, we assume that the court has the same target level for unemployment.
Our results would also go through if we had imposed a somewhat dierent target level of
unemployment for the court.
7Generally, however, the court's action is not perfectly predictable due to
the discretionary nature of the judicial system. Uncertainty with respect
to what judges do arises in common as well as in civil law systems as the
interpretation of the legal code is essentially done by judges along their pref-
erences. Thus, it is very likely not only the average weight with which the
losses from deviating from the government legislation are weighted. Quite
naturally, however, in a common law system { a legal tradition which allows
judges to interpret and implement government legislation to a larger extent
{ the judges' expression of opinions will also be more dispersed. This is not
to say that uncertainty does not play a role in civil law systems. Yet, it is
certainly a more salient feature in common law systems. The more inde-
pendent the legal system is, the more a judge can follow its own convictions.
Thus a government may not be able to predict the production of legal rulings
perfectly. Augmenting the weights with a random variable  allows us to take
this into account assuming that governments are uncertain about how labor
courts weigh their concern with unemployment against the losses that accrue
from deviating from the legal code.7
Assuming a loss function (3) that builds on two loss terms, one on the
policy preference, and the other on the deviation from the legal norm nds
widespread support in the relevant strands of the literature. Behavioral foun-
dations of judges suggest to take account policy-orientation when explaining
court outcomes (see Posner (2005)).8 Furthermore, there is a large body of
evidence on the political preferences of judges (see, e.g., George and Epstein
(1992), Songer and Lindquist (1996), Segal and Spaeth (1996), and Berger
and Neugart (2008)). However, judges are rarely entirely free to set policies
but are forced, at least to some degree, to take the existing labor market
regulation as a basis for their rulings. This suggests the inclusion of a loss
term for the deviation from the government policy level  (see also Posner
7Because there exist many labor courts and judges in those courts more or less fre-
quently change, we argue that uncertainty prevails over time and is not eroded by a
process of learning by the government.
8For example, Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) coin judges as \legislators in robes". A re-
cent contribution analyzing consequences on the evolution of common law from politically
motivated judges is Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007a).
8(1993)). While a judge may be able to deviate from the prevailing interpre-
tation of the legal code to express his own policy preferences, he will usually
also incur costs from doing so. Reversal from common legal practice may be
costly in terms of his career concerns (see also Levy (2005)), or in terms of
being alienated from other judges whose work he criticizes. In any case, a
deviation from a target level involves costly expression of a separate opinion
in terms of providing reasons for the judgement { an assumption which is
also made and extensively discussed in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007b).
2.3 Policy decisions
As indicated above, we assume that the government is the Stackelberg-leader
in this game between the government and the legal system. This assump-
tion is justied by the fact that regulation policy set by the government is
relatively infrequent whereas the actions of the court are more frequent.
Inserting equation (1) in the court's objective function (3), we nd the




((b + )   (1   k)(1   )b u): (4)
The court will set a more employment friendly regulation level the higher
is the non-regulation level of unemployment b u and the lower is the court's
(and the government's) employment target kb u. Periods of crises and struc-
tural eects, like globalization, which increase b u lead to more employment
friendly policies because judges as well are assumed to aim for low unem-
ployment. Moreover, regulation is increasing in the level of regulation set
by the government  because deviations from government regulation are to
some degree costly to the court. The court's regulation also increases as it
puts a higher relative weight (b) on losses incurring from enacting a legal
code which deviates from the legal code of the government.
As we argued above, the government is uncertain about the court's be-
havior. It cannot predict perfectly the relative weight with which deviations
from the government's regulation  are taken into account. Thus, solving for
9the government's policy after taking expectations yields
 =
c(1 + b)2b    (1   k)(b2 + 2)b u
c(1 + b)2 + b2 + 2 : (5)
Comparative statics on the optimal policy of the government yield the fol-
lowing results9:
  is decreasing in uncertainty 2, that is, the higher is the uncertainty
about the court's behavior the lower is the level of regulation set by
the government. If governments cannot fully control courts they are
prompted to be less aggressive in their regulation policy.
  is decreasing in b u reecting the fact that increases in trend unem-
ployment will lead governments to pursue a less aggressive regulatory
policy in order not to increase unemployment further.
  decreases more when b u increases if the uncertainty 2 about the
court's behavior is larger. That is, uncertainty and trend unemploy-
ment are mutually reinforcing in their inuence on government policy.
  is ambiguous in changes in b, the relative weight (net of uncertainty)
that the court puts on reaching its preferred level of worker protec-
tion. A fall in b would lower regulation if 2 > b. In the case of the
civil law system (with 2 approaching zero), a fall in b would increase
regulation. This is intuitive: as the court has lower costs from devi-
ating from government policy, government would compensate for this
through increasing regulation and vice versa.
  decreases more when b u increases if the weight b on deviations from
government regulation increases if 2 > b. That is, the eect from
uncertainty on government regulation is increased through higher un-
employment if uncertainty is large. Put dierently, if the weight b is
relatively large the level of regulation decreases less when b u increases
and b is slightly increased.
9In Appendix B we provide a formal derivation of the results.
10 Finally,  is increasing in c, the government's aversion to deviations
from its preferred level of regulation. Obviously, the more important
regulation is for the government, the more it will attempt to reach this
preferred level.
Using  one can determine the equilibrium level of e and then derive the
equilibrium unemployment. Both solutions are not shown or discussed as our
focus is on explaining labor market regulation.10
3 Evidence
Next, we use panel data to test for the predictions of our model, particularly
the eect of uncertainty of court behavior on governments' incentives to
change labor market regulation.
Estimation technique
Although we restrict ourselves (due to data availability) to a rather homo-
geneous set of OECD countries controlling for heterogeneity in a panel data
set is key. Thus, we want to have country and time xed eects included. One
of our independent variables, the way we measure uncertainty of the govern-
ment with respect to the behavior of the courts as described below, is time
invariant. This makes the time invariant measure of uncertainty co-linear
with the country xed eects. Recently, Troeger and Pl umper (2007) pro-
posed an estimation technique { xed eects vector decomposition { which
is able to cope with such data characteristics (which are quite common for
panel data analyses employing some sort of institutional explanatory vari-
ables.) The procedure of the xed eects vector decomposition is to carry
out a three step estimation. (1) In the rst step the unit xed eects are
estimated in a panel regression excluding the time-invariant right hand side
10Technically, the equilibrium level of e must be non-negative which requires that  is
suciently large. It is conceivable that governments have a non-positive target level of
regulation. However, in that case, a meaningful discussion of the interaction between the
government and the legal system is impossible and we neglect this case. Note also that
for a positive e we will always have a positive level of unemployment.
11variable. (2) Then the xed eects vector generated by the rst-stage re-
gression is regressed on the time-invariant variables by OLS. (3) Finally, a
pooled OLS model is estimated including all time-variant and time-invariant
explanatory variables as well as the unexplained part of the stage 2 regres-
sion (which we will denote with  later on). The idea behind this estimation
technique is to decompose on stage 2 the xed eects vector obtained from
stage 1 into a part that can be explained by the time-invariant variables and
an error term. Including the error term into the stage 3 regression takes ac-
count of all unobservable country eects. Various Monte-Carlo simulations
showed (see Troeger and Pl umper (2007)) that for the type of data that
we use this estimator is superior to a random eects model, a pooled OLS,
and the Hausman-Taylor model in terms of potentially biased estimates and
eciency.11
Data description
Our data comprises 19 OECD countries.12 As described below, our de-
pendent variable is available on a ve year basis starting in 1970. For some
countries data is only available for later periods. Thus, we have an unbal-
anced panel with slightly more than 100 observations.
As a measure for labor market regulation we recur to a (sub)index of the
Fraser Institute's Index of Economic Freedom.13 This index (lmr) quanties
labor market regulations such as minimum wages, hiring and ring practices,
the share of the labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective
bargaining, and unemployment benets (See table 1 for summary statistics
for all variables that we use.) In principle this index may vary between 0
and 10. Our sample has a mean of 4.73 with the most regulated economy
showing up with a value of 2.6 (the Netherlands in year 1970) and the least
regulated being classied with 8.1 (Japan in year 1985).
11The estimator is programmed in STATA. The ado and help les for the
xed eects vector decomposition estimator (xtfevd) can be downloaded from
www.polsci.org/pluemper/xtfevd.htm.
12See Appendix A for a list of countries.
13In Appendix A we provide a detailed description of all variables and corresponding
data sources.
12Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
lmr 4.73 1.53 2.6 8.1
ur 6.7 4.27 0.2 23.9
ination 6.8 5.58 -0.607 28.78
misery 3.21 1.19 -2.85 5.49
exe left 0.21 0.41 0 1
union 0.42 0.2 0.09 0.91
common 0.22 0.417 0 1
Our model recurs to variation in structural unemployment as the source
of crises to which governments and labor courts react in terms of regulation.
Because we lack panel data for that variable, we make use of the misery index
in our testing which uses the sum of the (logs of) the unemployment rate and
the ination rate. Based on the concept of a natural rate of unemployment,
our misery index serves as a proxy for the structural unemployment rate. De-
viations of the actual unemployment rate (which we measure) from a natural
rate of unemployment are adjusted for by the ination rate. According to the
natural rate hypothesis changes in the actual unemployment rate that mirror
a change in the underlying structural unemployment rate should not be ac-
companied by any variation in the ination rate. Contrarily, if for example a
drop in the unemployment rate did not reect a shift in the structural rate of
unemployment, ination should have increased which would lead to a smaller
(or no) change in the misery variable indicating that actual unemployment
decreased but not the structural rate. The mean unemployment rate in our
sample is 6.7%. The ination rate is averaging at 6.8%. Both variables show
considerable variation over time and countries and are negatively correlated.
The degree of uncertainty with which a government is confronted as courts
decide is central to our story. We use legal origin as a proxy for that. The
underlying assumption for using this indicator is that in a common law sys-
tem where courts decide on a case basis outcomes of the legal system may
vary to a larger extent than in a civil law system which codies (strict) rules
that judges have to follow.
13Note, however, that in our model a comparative static exercise looking
into the consequences of a change from a civil law system to a common law
systems maps into looking into the consequences of a (possible) decrease of
b combined with an increase in 2 on the level of labor market regulation.
Partial derivatives from our theoretical model imply that if the eect arising
from uncertainty is strong enough we should always observe a lower level of
regulation. Furthermore, we may utilize the cross derivatives for testing as
these also suggest that in a common law system the eect from an increase in
unemployment should lead to a larger decrease in labor market regulation if
uncertainty is a suciently strong driving variable. Technically, this predic-
tion relates to the results on the cross-derivatives @2=@b u@2 and @2=@b u@b
derived in Appendix B.
The notion of legal origin dening the discretion of the judiciary system
has gained considerable attention in the literature as a major cause for the
proliferation of market regulation. See, e.g., La Porta et al. (1998), Djankov
et al. (2002), Djankov et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (2004), and Botero et al.
(2005). We give a twist to the existing studies by using this well known indi-
cator also as a proxy for uncertainty from the perspective of the government
about how courts will handle labor market regulation. In principle, we use
the same indicator which draws on the CIA's World Factbook. The assertion
made in these references as to whether a legal system has a common or a
civil law origin refers to a country's legal system in general. Note that out
of the 19 countries in our sample, ve have a common (labor) law (Canada,
Germany, Ireland, United Kingdom, United States).
In order to control for other, possibly competing explanations of labor
market regulation, we introduce a set of additional variables. One may be
concerned that ideologies towards certain types of regulatory actions explain
economic policy reform. In this case, simply the color of the ruling gov-
ernments should have an impact on the policy. For this we control with a
dummy variable that is one (and otherwise zero) if the executive stemmed
from the left side of the political spectrum as dened by the World Bank
Indicators on Political Institutions. Furthermore, we take care of the poten-
tial inuence interest groups may exert on labor market regulation. Here we
14opted for union density as a proxy for the inuence of trade unions on (labor
market) policies. The sample mean for union density is at roughly 40% of
the workforce (ranging from 9% to 91%).
All variables are averages of the last ve years, i.e. a variable at a given
year t holds the average of the values for t, t   1, t   2, t   3, and t   4.
We address potential causality problems by lagging the misery index and its
interaction with the legal system variable (common) by ve years.
Results
In table 2 the regression results are summarized. Model 1 presents the
results of the third stage regression where we included the lagged dependent
variable14, common which relates to the weight b of our theoretical model
and is also the measure for the uncertainty (2) that a government faces with
respect to the behavior of the court system, the misery index (lagged by ve
years), time dummies d, the decomposed error  from the second stage re-
gression, and a constant. Note, that the xed eects vector decomposition
technique allows us to include the time invariant variable common while tak-
ing account of country xed eects comprised by . The point estimate for
the dummy common yields a positive sign implying a lower level of labor
market regulation (Remember that higher levels of lmr coincide with lower
labor market regulation.) Thus, the data suggests that the uncertainty which
comes with a common law system compared to a civil law system trumps the
potentially countervailing eect arising from a larger weight for deviations
from government's labor market regulation. As one might also expect, neg-
ative shocks to the economy indicated by a higher misery variable reduce
labor market regulation. Year dummies are signicant for 1975 and 1995.
Furthermore, the unobservable country eects  are signicant. In summary
this lends support to our theoretical model. Results are robust if further
controls are included as shown in column 3. Neither the political color of
the government exe left, nor union density as a proxy for the inuence of
interest groups shows up signicantly.
14Note, however, that our estimates are subject to the Nickell bias as N > T. Thus,
an interpretation of the size of the parameter with respect to the speed of the adjustment
process would be misleading.
15As argued before, the cross-partial derivatives of the theoretical model
suggest that if uncertainty is pervasive we should also nd interaction eects
with unemployment pointing towards lower labor market regulation. We
can test for this prediction by the inclusion of an interaction term for the
misery variable and the common variable. Model 2 conrms the proposition.
The estimated parameter for the interaction term (common  misery(t  
5)) is positive and signicant at the 1% level suggesting that governments
facing common law legal systems deregulate more as unemployment rises.
However, the inclusion of the interaction eect renders the coecient on
the common variable insignicant. This does not come as a surprise given
that common and the interaction eect are strongly correlated. Apart from
this the comparison of Model 2 and Model 1 shows that results are robust.
This is also true if we include the control variables on the political color
of the government and union density in addition to the interaction term.
Model 4 compared to Model 2 shows the same pattern of signicant variables
with the size of the estimated parameters hardly changing. In terms of the
quantitative eects, an increase in misery by one standard deviation leads
to an increase in lmr by 0.3 points evaluated at the sample mean of common
for Model 2.
Robustness
Overall, we are quite satised with our empirical ndings. A check for
robustness of Model 2 where we excluded countries sequentially from our
sample was rather promising. Only in one case (Japan) the parameter on the
misery variable became (marginally) insignicant.15 Apart from the potential
sensitivity of the results on the inclusion of certain countries { which overall
occurs not to be the case { one may raise concerns with respect to our
endogenous variable as the Fraser Institute is usually considered as a liberal
think-tank perhaps biasing the labor market regulation index. Firstly, such a
bias will not aect our results as long as it leads to an exaggerated description
of the extent of labor market regulation throughout the panel. Secondly, the
15Note, however, that our results react sensitively to the inclusion of New Zealand in
our sample.
16Global Labor Survey, an internet based survey among labor practitioners
including union leaders, activists or professor for labor law revealed that
the index by the Fraser Institute (which we use) gives a similar picture as
the Global Labor Survey (Chor and Freeman (2005)). This lends additional
support to our choice. The advantage of the Fraser Institute is its time
dimension which gives us an additional source of variation.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we look at the issue of labor market policy regulation. Our
approach diers from the existing literature in that we explicitly take into
account labor courts as a strategic player. We believe that the role of courts
has so far been largely neglected in studying governments' incentives for pol-
icy change. This is problematic, given the ample evidence concerning the
discretion that courts have in interpreting the legal code. Our main nding
is that as labor courts' actions are more uncertain from the perspective of
the government, governments will reform more intensively. The more discre-
tion labor courts have, the more governments have an incentive to pursue
employment friendly regulatory policy. In addition to the formal derivation
of this result, we also present evidence to support this nding. Taking the
legal origin of countries as a proxy for judiciary discretion, and thus uncer-
tainty about labor courts' actions, we nd that governments' policies dier
signicantly in response to crises. Countries with a civil law origin respond
less to economic crisis than countries with a common law system.
While we stress the interaction between governments enacting labor mar-
ket regulation and labor courts activity, there are certainly other elds of
economic policy making where this type of interaction between governments
and the legal system could play an important role in explaining policy mak-
ing. There is, for instance, also little knowledge about economic policy mak-
ing in the context of a European legal system, an issue which is becoming
more and more important for national policymakers.
17Table 2: Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable lmr lmr lmr lmr
lmr(t-5) 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.38*** 0.38***
(0.084) (0.082) (0.087) (0.087)
common 1.58*** -0.11 1.44*** -0.42
(0.248) (0.689) (0.268) (0.781)
misery(t-5) 0.18*** 0.14** 0.30*** 0.23***
(0.062) (0.059) (0.092) (0.088)
commonmisery(t-5) 0.48*** 0.55***
(0.189) (0.217)




d1975 0.48** 0.53*** 0.71*** 0.74***
(0.202) (0.201) (0.244) (0.240)
d1980 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.18
(0.18) (0.173) (0.196) (0.191)
d1985 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08
(0.168) (0.164) (0.186) (0.181)
d1995 0.32* 0.36** 0.43** 0.46**
(0.175) (0.173) (0.203) (0.198)
d2000 0.13 0.24 0.34* 0.40*
(0.177) (0.180) (0.211) (0.209)
 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00***
(0.138) (0.130) (0.159) (0.148)
constant 2.16*** 2.32*** 1.36*** 1.70***
(0.414) (0.411) (0.538) (0.533)
Observations 104 104 93 93
Adj. R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.90
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Estimated with panel xed eects regression with vector decomposition.
STATA's estimation command: xtfevd.
18Appendix A: Data sources
In the following we summarize the denitions of the variables used in the
regression models and the data sources.
 countries: The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, United States.
 lmr: Labor market regulation as measured by the Fraser Institute's
Index of Economic Freedom, Area 5B. This comprises information on
labor market regulations such as minimum wages, hiring and ring
practices, the share of the labor force whose wages are set by cen-
tralized collective bargaining and unemployment benets system. The
index may vary between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating a less
regulated economy. Source: Economic Freedom of the World, 2005
Annual Report by J. Gwartney, R. Lawson and E. Gartzke.
 misery: This variable is the sum of the logs of the unemployment rate
ur and the ination rate ination in a respective country at time t
as an average of the past ve years. The ination rate is based on
consumer prices. The unemployment rate corresponds to the OECD's
denition of standardized unemployment rates. Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators (http : ==web:worldbank:org) and OECD (http :
==www1:oecd:org=scripts
=cde=members=lfsindicatorsAuthenticate:asp)
 common: This is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for all countries
classied as having a common law origin. The variable is zero for all
other cases. Legal origin is dened as in Botero et al. (2005). Source:
http : ==mba:tuck:dartmouth:edu=pages=faculty=rafael:laporta=
publications:html and CIA World Factbook 2007,
https : ==www:cia:gov=cia=publications=factbook=.
19 exe left: This variable is based on data provided by the World Bank
Indicators on Political Institutions. The variable holds the ve year
average of a dummy variable that is one if the party aliation of
the executive is left. Source: DPI2004 Database of Political Insti-
tutions: Changes and Variable Denitions, by P. Keefer, July 2005
(http : ==econ:worldbank:org).
 union: Union density as a ve year average of yearly values. The values
for the years 1996-2000 are averages of the years 1996 to 1998. Source:
LMIDB Version 2.0, Nickell and Nunziata (2001).
Appendix B: Derivation of partial eects











2 + b2 + 22 < 0
An increase in the uncertainty about the court's preference weights will lead
the government to lower its level of regulation. It also implies that the cross-
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2 + b2 + 22 > 0
That is, an increase in the relative weight the government puts on reaching
its target level of regulation b  will clearly lead to a higher actual level of
regulation.
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2 + b2 + 22
That is, an increase in b, the relative weight that the court puts on following
the laws of the government will lead to an increase in the level of regulation
set by the government if uncertainty is suciently high. In the case that
there is no uncertainty (2 = 0), government regulation will fall. Govern-
ment knowing that the court will follow and truthfully implement labor laws
forces it to avoid setting too high a level of regulation in order to keep un-
employment low. It will increase regulation in response to b if uncertainty is
high enough.
Note that 2 > b is only possible if b is suciently small. Since " is
distributed between ( b;1), however, its variance can take easily values larger
than b if the latter is not too large.
Note also that the cross-derivative @2
@b@b u is positive if 2 > b and vice versa.
Legal systems, uncertainty, and its eect on labor mar-
ket regulation
A change in the legal system in general can have two eects: our main
hypothesis is that a common law systems allows more discretion to the labor
court. This materializes in an increase in uncertainty (as we argue in the
main paper), but it could also imply a reduction in b as one may argue that
a common law system entails lower costs for labor courts to deviate from
government set regulation.
Taking into accounts that a common law system as opposed to a civil law
system could entail both eects, the total eect of a comparison of the law








21Thus, a common law system should lower regulation if this expression is
negative. Since the rst term is always negative and b would likely fall under
common law, the second partial derivative should be positive, which is the
case if uncertainty is large enough. Even if this were not the case, regulation
would also fall if the overall change in db is relatively small in comparison
to d2, that is, if the common law systems has a stronger inuence on un-
certainty than on the court's costs of not following government regulation.
If uncertainty is the dominant characteristic and if uncertainty is relatively
large, regulation will thus always be lower under common law. Notice that
in this case an increase in b u has an additional negative inuence on  as our
discussion of the cross-derivatives establishes.
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